Australian Real Progressives has written about full employment and the job guarantee many times previously. What follows is a historical analysis of how the mythical NAIRU came into being and why Full employment, in the truest sense, was abandoned.
Via Bill Mitchell
Full employment gave tremendous advantages to the working class and allowed for upward inter-generational socioeconomic mobility – where children born into poorer families could aspire to transcend that social class and enter the more secure middle class.
And as capital became more concentrated – through takeovers etc, and, trade unions became more powerful, the two conflicting forces obviously gained increasing price setting power.
Firms set prices according to markups which reflected their expected profit return on capital and unions, representing their workforces, could exert power to gain wage increases.
As a result real wages mostly grew in proportion with productivity growth which reduced the likelihood of a realisation crisis (expenditure lagging behind production) but also reduced income inequalities and allowed workers to fast track into middle class life (and mass consumption).
But that increase in ‘price setting’ power brought a new propensity to crisis relating not to unemployment but rather to inflationary biases.
The – 1973 OPEC Oil Crises – triggered an inflationary spiral driven by the ‘battle of the markups’ (the conflictual struggle between capital and labour for real income shares).
The existing Keynesian policy consensus had really only constructed inflation threats in terms of demand pull events – where nominal spending outstrips the capacity of the economy to respond by producing more real goods and services.
There was some delay among policy elites in grasping what a raw material price hike (particularly one that is imported – such as the oil shock) meant when it interacted with the distributional conflict between labour and capital.
The point was that nations as a whole had to take a real income loss because an essential raw material they imported now took a larger share of nominal income.
So who would take that loss?
Capital didn’t want to take it, and, rather tried to pass it onto workers by increasing their markups and pushing up prices, thereby reducing real wages and the purchasing power of workers.
But strong trade unions were not keen to accept that profit push and ‘real wage resistance’ became a force, which was expressed in increased wage demands – thereby restoring the real wage cuts resulting from the price rises.
As both sides had price setting power, a price-wage spiral was easy to trigger and that is what happened.
Before long, inflation was accelerating away and governments, under the influence of the emerging Monetarist paradigm in macroeconomics, sought to cut net spending.
This resulted in rising unemployment coinciding with accelerating inflation, which we called ‘stagflation’ – the twin evils.
The rising unemployment was devastating but airbrushed by the Monetarists as being an essential ‘natural’ adjustment that we just had to tolerate to stabilise inflation.
And so the ‘natural rate of unemployment’ or NAIRU (non-accelerating-inflation-rate-of-unemployment) entered the picture and governments were told that there was no longer a choice to use discretionary fiscal expansion to reduce unemployment.
The only thing that would result from this strategy, we were told, was that inflation would continue to accelerate and only stabilise when the natural rate of unemployment was reached.
You can read more at Bill’s blog. This is the most lucid explanation of stagflation from an MMT point of view. It makes it clear that conflicting classes business and labour both had price-setting power and coupled with a supply shock that caused 70’s stagflation. We are a far cry from that conflictual relationship today.